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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS- WHAT CONSTITUTES
A FICTITIOUS PAYEE
An agent for an insurance company in the settlement of claims
against it, with authority to sign and execute drafts, executed drafts in
favor of certain claimants but failed to deliver them. Instead he forged
the signatures of the payees as endorsers, and collected on the drafts
through his own bank. The plaintiff, after indemnifying the insurance
company, sued the bank. It was held that the plaintiff might recover
on the theory of money paid under mistake of fact.'
Under section 9(3) of the N. I. L.' an instrument is payable to
bearer "when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
Unquestionably this rule was adopted to protect subsequent bona fide
holders from the rigors of the forged indorsement rule, where the maker
or drawer uses a fictitious payee in order to clothe the instrument with
additional credit; still, it has been a prolific source of litigation in cases
where an agent, having authority to draw in the name of his principal,
forges the signature of the make-believe payee and uses the instrument
for his own benefit.3
Whether the payee is a "fictitious person" within the meaning of
the act so as to make the instrument payable to bearer is determined
largely, if not altogether, by the intention of the one making the instru-
ment, and not by the existence or non-existence of the payee.4 Thus
where the instrument is payable to an existing person but without intent
that he should receive it, the payee is fictitious, within the rule.' On the
other hand, where the instrument is payable to a non-existing person,
believed to be existing, with the intent that he should receive it, the
payee is not fictitious, within the rule.0
To what extent the presence or absence of an actual interest in the
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payee will affect the rule is not completely settled. If the payee is a real
person who has a definite interest in the transaction, it is frequently
implied that he cannot be a fictitious payee, regardless of the intention
of the maker.' But in a case where this factor was present, no difficulty
was experienced in finding that the instrument was payable to bearer.'
However, where the payee has no definite interest but the maker intends
that he should have such an interest he is not a fictitious payee.9
Who is the "person making it so payable" whose knowledge is essen-
tial to bring into operation section 9(3) of the N. I. L., so as to make
the instrument payable to bearer? On its face, the phrase seems clear
enough, and yet considerable conflict exists with respect to its interpre-
tation. Some courts hold that it refers to the named maker or drawer,"
while others hold that it refers to the person actually drawing the
instrument. 1 Courts favoring the view that it is the named maker or
drawer whose knowledge is required reach about the same result as
courts favoring the other view, because they are willing, in the ordinary
case, to impute this knowledge to the principal.' 2 So it may be said, and
practically all courts agree, that, in the absence of complicating factors,
where an agent with authority to draw negotiable instruments draws a
note, check or draft payable to a fictitious or non-existing payee and
then endorses the name of such payee, the bank or person taking it for
value will be protected on the theory that such an instrument is payable
to bearer and so requires no indorsement to pass title.' 3 A like result is
reached where the agent is allowed merely to fill in the payee's name.' 4
But if the agent, without authority to draw negotiable instruments,
induces his principal to draw a note, check or draft payable to one whom
the agent knows to be fictitious, the courts are in general accord in
holding that the instrument is not payable to bearer and therefore
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requires a bona fide indorsement to pass title.'5 Feeling, perhaps, that it
would be more just to protect the subsequent holder in this type of case,
several states have broadened their statutes to take care of this situation. 6
Moreover, a recent California case, dealing with a comparable situation,
adopted a more liberal view. In that case an employee of one of the
bank's depositors purchased cashier's checks and prevailed upon the bank
to make them payable to an actual person whom he intended to have
no interest in them, and the court held that the checks were payable
to bearer.' 7
A complicating factor in some of the cases has been the necessity of
having more than one individual sign the note or draft. This would
-etm to make more difficult the application of the rules heretofore con-
sidered with respect to cases where the named maker or drawer is a
different person from the one actually drawing the instrument. Espe-
cially is this true under the view that the knowledge or intent of the
person actually drawing the instrument is controlling, for there it appears
logical to require .ll signers to have a similar interest." Furthermore,
the requirement for more than one signature is used in most instances
as a safeguard against fraudulent agents. Oddly enough, in the few
instances in which this problem has come up, the courts have taken the
view that the fraudulent intent of one of two co-signers is sufficient to
render the instrument payable to bearer.'
As in many other situations arising under the N. I. L., the question
here is as to which one of two innocent parties will be called upon to
sustain a loss due to the fraudulent act of some third party. Likewise,
as in other situations, the courts appear to be willing to mitigate the
hardship which may result from an arbitrary application of the rule by
introducing additional restrictions on its operation. Just as the fictitious
payee rule modifies the forged indorsement rule, so the rule which favors
the party least at fault offsets any unfairness which may result from the
operation of the fictitious payee rule.
The principal case offers an excellent example of this technique.
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The court emphasizes the fact that the drafts in question were not
ordinary drafts in that they contained statements of their purpose to
release claims against the insurance company, and that the fraudulent
agent was a regular depositor in the defendant bank. The court then
says: "It does not seem to us a sufficient answer to all this to say that,
within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act the drafts were
payable to fictitious payees, even assuming such to be the legal effect of
what was done." While it might be argued that the provision for release
in the drafts was for the purpose of protecting the insurance company
from further liability on the same claims, and not to protect it against
forgery, the presence of such a provision furnished additional evidence
of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Viewed in this light there can be no doubt but that the court was
seeking to perform substantial justice, and it probably succeeded. And
this is none the less true because a different result was reached in a case
in the federal court with respect to the same sort of drafts, 2 for the
attending facts in that case were such as to negative any claim of
negligence on the part of the defendant. V. L. A.
PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE - PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY IN ACTION
AGAINST CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS OF STATUTORY
POLICE EMPLOYEES
In a recent federal case, Brie Railroad v. Johnson,1 plaintiff sued
the defendant railroad company alleging an assault and battery, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution by three railroad police officers
commissioned by the Governor and compensated by the defendant,
pursuant to sections 915 o and 9151 of the Ohio General Code. The
latter section provides "policemen so appointed, and commissioned sev-
erally shall possess and exercise the powers, and be subject to the
liabilities of policemen of cities in the several counties in which they are
authorized to act while discharging the duties for which they are
appointed." Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the three police
officers, one of whom was a lieutenant, while investigating a reported
theft of railroad propery, discovered plaintiff in an abandoned garage
of an oil company, where he was seeking shelter from the rain; they
"Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co., 23 F. Supp.
53 (Ohio 1938). Note (1939) 6 Un. of Chi. L. Rev. 700.
'Erie R. v. Johnson, io6 F. (zd) SO (1939).
